To get some idea of why Antonin Scalia as Supreme Court
justice is held in such high regard one only need read his dissent in PGA Tour,
Inc. v Martin. That it isn’t a major case may make it more accessible on its
own terms. The case involved a professional golfer, Casey Martin, who suffered
from a degenerative birth defect that made walking increasingly painful who
sued the PGA Tour to use a by rules prohibited golf cart in competition under
the American Disabilities Act. The majority sided with Martin, with Scalia
writing the dissent and joined by Thomas.
Scalia’s first and perhaps most fundamental objection is
that the case fits the ADA requirements. He begins:
The Court holds that a professional sport is a place
of
public accommodation and that respondent is a
“customer"
of “competition” when he practices his
profession.
Ante, at 17. It finds, ante, at 18, that this strange
conclusion
is compelled by the “literal text” of Title III of
the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
it
is worth pointing out that the assumption which
underlies
that question is false. Nowhere is it writ that
PGA
TOUR golf must be classic “essential” golf. Why
cannot
the PGA TOUR, if it wishes, promote a new game,
with
distinctive rules.
But
the rules are the rules.
They
are (as in all games) entirely arbitrary, and there is
no
basis on which anyone— not even the Supreme Court of
the
United States— can pronounce one or another of them
to
be “nonessential” if the rulemaker (here the PGA
TOUR)
deems it to be essential.
If
one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some
legal
obligation to play classic, Platonic golf— and if one
assumes
the correctness of all the other wrong turns the
Court
has made to get to this point— then we Justices
must
confront what is indeed an awesome responsibility.
It
has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme
Court
of the United States, laid upon it by Congress in
pursuance
of the Federal Government’s power “[t]o regulate
Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several
States,”
U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, to decide What Is
Golf.
I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution,
aware
of the 1457 edict of King James II of Scotland prohibiting
golf
because it interfered with the practice of
archery,
fully expected that sooner or later the paths of
golf
and government, the law and the links, would once
again
cross, and that the judges of this august Court
would
some day have to wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential
question,
for which their years of study in the
law
have so well prepared them: Is someone riding around
a
golf course from shot to shot really a golfer? The answer,
we
learn, is yes. The Court ultimately concludes, and it
will
henceforth be the Law of the Land, that walking is not
a “fundamental”
aspect of golf.
Either
out of humility or out of self-respect (one or the
other)
the Court should decline to answer this incredibly
difficult
and incredibly silly question.
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