End the Torture, Golf Broadcasting Needs a Rethink

We’re through the four majors of the 2015 golf season. With a fresh crop of stars emerging with some obvious rivalries the competitive landscape appears bright. The golf fan would have much to look forward to if it wasn’t for the awful state of golf broadcasting which is anything but fresh. Apart from showing many more holes the approach to telecasting golf has barely changed in my lifetime and despite the majors being covered by three different networks there’s no discernible difference among those networks in how the game is called. The exception is the European Tour events which are quite well done.

You might think that the reason the Euro Tour is better is that the Brits just know how to call golf, but then there’s Nick Faldo, so that’s clearly not it. There is a certain unfamiliarity advantage. But I think the biggest advantage is that the Euro Tour is covered with a comparatively skeleton crew. Which leads me to the following thoughts on how to telecast golf (with the majors primarily in mind).


1. Less is more, a lot less is a lot more:
There is an extraordinary excess in the amount of commentary. At points we have a reporter on the ground, an announcer at that particular hole, the host, a lead analyst all intent on interjecting something onto the proceedings. Watching golf you come away convinced that the announcers are being paid by the word. More forgivable are the suitable for radio comments particularly for putts; he comes up short, that was right all the way…What is needed is little more than quick orientation comments of the Day, second shot on 14 variety. The presumption should be to say nothing rather than something. Pay announcers by setting a ceiling amount and then deducting for each word.


2. You’re at the event live. That’s your niche:
We now have 24 hour sports stations, and an entire channel devoted to nothing but golf. The one unique thing the telecast brings to the table is that it is live. For the love of God, SHOW SHOTS. Instead we get taped segments and after round player interviews, you know all the things already beaten to death, available elsewhere, inherently dull (has a player ever said anything even remotely interesting in a post round interview?).


3. We’re just not that into you:
Somehow our main announcers think they’re a big reason why we watch. Other than the intro, there is absolutely no reason to show the announcers. Worst of the worst here was Fox, which seemed to believe that we were more interested in watching their announce team sitting behind their desk discuss the tournament than actually seeing it.

This is also where we run into my first law of sports broadcasting; the more shtick, the earlier your sell by date. Gary McCord started on CBS in 1986. Do the math. Even David Feherty who I find really inventive and funny is starting to grate. And the hosts are all terribly over-exposed. I get quite enough Joe Buck in the football season, thanks.


4. More players are in contention than you think:
Remarkably the networks are still getting caught out ignoring a player who almost wins the event until the very end. In particular, last groupitis appears to be incurable. This is especially true during the early rounds when essentially everyone is in it. There’s simply no good reason to spend telecast time showing Phil walking, Phil standing, Phil discussing what to do with his caddie on a particular shot. At one point during the British Open we watched the player and spectators search for his lost ball. How ‘bout coming back to that when it’s resolved.


5. Enough with instruction:
I maybe alone on this (as opposed to all of the above?), but at least during the majors I don’t want playing tips and swing instruction. I get it, you know the game. But I can find all the golf instruction, and then some, in other venues. To repeat, you’re live, at the event. The tournament is the thing. At one point we had 3 or 4 Fox analysts tell us how they strike the ball when putting on dodgy greens. Since we can’t actually see that or know which players are doing one or the other that commentary tells us nothing about the actual tournament at hand.

The best stretch of announcing was actually delivered on Thursday or Friday of the U.S. Open in the otherwise terrible coverage of FOX. Late in the day and down to a small backup crew, FOX stumbled into something. Shane O’Donoghue, who’s actually a golf guy, was spare and unobtrusive in the host role and analysts Flesch and Pavin made single comments and moved on. It was almost enough to give a golf fan hope.
 ^.

NCAA tournament, what to watch for

A few years ago Gregg Easterbrook in his Tuesday Morning Quarterback column suggested that the area that NFL teams got wrong most consistently was that they punted too often.  In a similar vein I’ve been watching college basketball for years convinced that the way coaches handle players in foul trouble is horrifically misguided.  Indeed, just by observation you would think a fifth foul doesn’t eliminate the player who commits it but leads to an automatic forfeiture of the game. 

I will concede that not having your better players available at the end of the game is a significant penalty and that the last few minutes of a game have a higher value than the other minutes.  But I’m convinced that coaches lose more time for their players by trying to keep them from fouling than they would give up if they just let them play.  Current coaching practice seems to be that a player sits after his second foul in the first for the remainder of the half, they may get benched again if they pick up a third foul at the beginning of the second half, and unquestionably they will be taken out after their fourth foul, usually until the last few minutes of the game.

If this year is like past years, you are very likely to watch a NCAA tournament game where a team with the lead, loses that lead because their best player is on the bench so that he doesn’t foul out of the game.  Compounding the mistake, the team(s) that lose this way will often be heavy underdogs where you would think to win they should be taking more not less chances.

Following this cautious strategy makes even less sense for established teams during the regular season.  The penalty for losing a game or two just isn’t that great anymore.  So why not prepare for the tournament?  Why not have players learn how to play through foul trouble, and if they do foul out, have your team learn how to cope without them?

In any event that’s what I’ll be paying attention to during the tournament.  You watch, some team will lose because their coach had a key player riding the pines so that he didn’t foul out.  As currently coached, college teams impose a greater penalty on themselves for fouls than the officials.

College basketball; why I hate the conference tournaments

I believe the only conference which doesn’t have a tournament to conclude its season is the Ivy League. Having a tournament is fine but that the automatic bids to the NCAA tournament go to the tournament rather than regular season champion is an assault on reason. 

Of course for teams in the bigger conferences it doesn’t make any difference.  But for the so called mid-majors this is a big deal, and something of an outrage.  Every year teams win their conferences by compiling an excellent record over months only to lose out on an NCAA bid because they lose a game in a conference tournament.  How does winning 3 or 4 games in a row over as many days constitute a better selection process than who won the most games over a couple of months?  Why should the ultimate reward for the participants go to the former rather than latter team?

Thus, the just completed Sun Belt tournament was won by Western Kentucky who will now get to participate in March Madness.  In conference play the Hilltoppers won 7 and lost 9.  The team that won the conference was Middle Tennessee with a record of 14 and 2.  But they had a bad night and lost in the conference tournament so they go home.  How does that make sense?

So why conference tournaments, and why use them to select the automatic bid?  Some part perhaps is attributable to keeping hope alive, and giving everyone a chance.  But surely the main reason must be money.  A conference tournament produces ticket sales and television coverage.  It’s unlikely that the television money would be there if the tournament didn’t determine the bid to the NCAA tournament.  It’s almost enough to make you hate capitalism.

Questioning a basketball statistic - cause or effect?

I’m watching the Minnesota vs Iowa basketball game, and at the start of the contest the announcers stated that when Iowa outrebounds the other team they win, and when they lose the rebounding battle they lose.  O’K, but what does that actually tell you?  Obviously it is intended to tell you that for Iowa the game is won or lost by rebounding.  But I wonder if this is actually the case. 

You will I think concede that most rebounds are on the defensive side, the defender usually being in better position.  So suppose Minnesota makes 50% of their shots, and Iowa makes only 25% of their shots, and otherwise in every respect the teams are equal.  The result will be a) Minnesota will win b) Minnesota will have more rebounds than Iowa and c) Minnesota will have the rebounding advantage not because they were better at it or put forth more effort but simply because Iowa missed more shots.

NFC playoffs

The dirty little secret of sports is that the championship isn’t as significant as the fan generally thinks.  Except we aren’t really inclined to think about it, unless we happen to be fans of very good teams that end up not winning the championship.

But not having a dog in the fight, that’s the main thing I take away from the NFC playoffs this weekend.  With the 9 – 7 Giants beating the 15 – 1 Packers and the up from nowhere 13 -3 49ers defeating the more established 13 -3 Saints it is at least arguable that the two best teams in the NFC have been dispatched by lesser opponents.  As I’ve argued before [http://porcupinehuddle.blogspot.com/2011/10/some-thoughts-on-baseballsports.html] there is a certain ambiguity in sports and how it defines best.  One would normally think that best would be determined over a suitably long period of time, but actual sports operate playoff systems that tend to reward ‘getting hot’ at the right time rather than consistent excellence.

And no that isn’t sour grapes from a disappointed Packer fan.  I grew up in Minnesota.  Enough said on that score, I should think.

A random football thought

In the few minutes of the football game that I watched last night, there was a sequence that would be interesting to probe further.  The Pittsburgh quarterback threw a pass to an open receiver for what would’ve been a first down but he dropped it; the next play was a pass interception. 

What I’d like to know is just how damaging is a dropped pass, or to extend the thought a bit the penalty that negates a first down.  If you think about it, a sport like football is trying to attain a balance between offense and defense so that one would suppose that getting a first down in four plays (really three in most situations) is reasonably probable but not easy.  Or to put it another way, that in a set of downs, the offense will only have so many opportunities to move the ball the required distance.  So what is the “cost” of wasting one of those opportunities?

When you watch baseball the announcers frequently mention that you can’t give a team extra outs.  In a sort of obverse way, it’s always seemed to me that teams rarely succeed twice in football.  I have no way of knowing what the true statistic is, but I’d bet that a dropped pass, or off target pass that would’ve been a first down or resulted in significant yardage is not a small error.

More thoughts on NBA economist: spending and wins

I linked earlier to this interview of economist Kevin Murphy regarding the NBA lockout.

http://www.nba.com/2011/news/features/steve_aschburner/10/27/lockout-q-and-a-kevin-murphy/index.html  It's in the player’s interest to have as few restrictions as possible on spending so it isn’t surprising that Murphy brings up the weak correlation between spending and wins.  But beyond management skill there may be other reasons why the link between spending and wins is weak.

Wins is a simplistic measure of outcomes.  There is a pass/fail element in the NBA that just looking at wins misses.  The most notable is making and missing the playoffs, and closely related, finishing in the top four of the playoff teams and being in the bottom four.  Because the league is split into two conferences and those conferences aren’t of equal quality the payoff for wins isn’t equal and thus the incentive to spend is also unequal. 

For example, in the East, Indiana made the playoffs with a 37 – 45 record, while Houston (43 – 39), Phoenix (40 – 42) and Utah (39 – 43) missed the playoffs in the West.  It would make sense for Indiana—and by extension other marginal teams in the East—to pay more for wins than a comparable team in the West because the payoff will be greater, namely a spot in the playoffs.

Teams that are badly situated will have to overspend.  Players are likely to want to play for franchises that are likely to win, are located in desirable cities, and have nice weather.  So bad teams or teams located in small and or cold cities are going to have to spend more to attract comparable players.  If you’re offered the same amount to play in Miami or Minneapolis during the winter, where would you go?

Rookie contracts:  There are only 30 teams so it wouldn't take all that many outliers to result in a weak link between spending and wins.  One factor that would result in a high ratio of wins to money spent is landing a high quality player through the draft.  Getting lucky in the draft lottery can result in a team (see Chicago, Oklahoma) having a key player or two who is significantly under paid.  And as Murphy points out, because there are only five players on the court and no limit on how much the top player handles the ball or shoots this can have a large impact on wins to spending.

Multi-year contracts:  The existing labor agreement and market results in no cut contracts for multiple years.  Thus, it shouldn’t surprise that spending won’t tie very closely with winning since franchises aren’t able to adjust quickly to the lack of results.  For example, Cleveland is stuck with players and contracts that might’ve made sense with Lebron James on the team but don’t without him.  Once a player signs their second or third contract for more money they may get hurt or more likely lose interest in the game but the team still has to pay them.

In short, it doesn’t surprise me that spending more doesn’t result in wins in a particular season but that result should be treated skeptically. I would suspect that the correlation would be greater if you looked at a longer time frame, say five or ten years.  It would also help if you allowed for other factors like draft position, climate, and expanded the definition of success by taking into account making or missing the playoffs.

NBA lockout and business of sports

I’ve thought for a long time that coverage of sports would be markedly improved if it brought in a different group of reporters.  The standard reporter loves sports and has a journalism degree, which is all well and good, but it results in a limited perspective.  My two years getting a masters degree in business has made a huge difference in how I view and think about sports.

A good example of what I have in mind is this excellent interview between Steve Aschburner and a renowned economist who is assisting the players in the NBA labor negotiations. http://www.nba.com/2011/news/features/steve_aschburner/10/27/lockout-q-and-a-kevin-murphy/index.html  The whole thing is well worth reading if you are interested in professional sports, but I want to focus on two points in particular.

First, the revenue percentage that the players were looking for (57% in the expired deal, 52% is their current position against managements 50%) didn’t strike me as very high.  Having worked in service businesses on the financial side I know that compensation costs with the firms I’ve been involved in all ran higher than that, although I realize you’d have additional compensation costs that would have to be added to the players in order to get the total.  The economist makes the same point:

NBA.com: Many people understand that NBA players as a select group of specialized, highly skilled workers. Are there many many instances, though, in which labor commands more than 50 percent of an industry's costs?

KM: In certain sectors, there's a ton. You go to a law firm, most of its cost is labor. You've got to remember, labor is 60-something percent of the economy. In the service sector, it can be much higher than that. And these people really define the product. These are the ones people come to see.

What separates the NBA from a different basketball league? Well, it's the players. The basketball's' the same, the court's the same, it's the players who really are the distinguishing feature. That's not to say that the league doesn't have value. But the defining characteristic and the scarce resource, if you think about it from an economic point of view, is the talent. It's not unlike Hollywood, the music business or any of the other ones where the thing that distinguishes one person from another is the talent.

Second, when you hear that most of the franchises are losing money you tend to lean a bit towards the owners.  But then you see that people are still willing to pay record prices when a franchise is sold and wonder what is going on.  I think a big part of it is that these aren’t normal businesses but rather a mix between a business and a rare luxury good.  It’s been a while, but I seem to recall from reading Buckley’s books on sailing that owning a yacht was a money losing venture too.  So what?  That doesn’t mean people aren’t going to want yachts.  I don't know, but I doubt people make money from a membership into Augusta National. How many people knew or cared about George Steinbrenner before he owned the Yankees?  Or Mark Cuban?  Here again the economist makes a similar point (after going through the franchise appreciation benefit) he says:

KM: Secondly, it's a lot of fun to own an NBA franchise...

NBA.com: The "psychic benefits" Malcolm Gladwell touts.

KM: The psychic benefits are not trivial. Third, there are benefits outside basketball. Like who got a casino? Who got a land deal? Who got real estate? You start looking around, you say, 'There's a lot of benefits to being an NBA owner." You put all those pieces together, it explains why those people spent all that money for those franchises.

We are told all the time that sports is a business.  True enough, but we need to keep in mind that it is a very particular, peculiar business so that easy generalizations from what we think we know about the business world are likely to lead us astray.

The baseball closer

The recently concluded Yankees vs Tigers playoff series suggests some of the difficulties which I tried to address in the prior post.  Compared to the regular season a five game series is ridiculously small.  NBA series are .085 of the season schedule (7/82), NFL is .063 (1/16) and the first round in baseball is .031 (5/162).  Funny to hear all the talk of what the Yankees have to do to address their problems now that they find themselves on the wrong end of what is almost surely a statistically insignificant difference.

That said, that in mind, still….still you couldn’t help but notice and ponder that the greatest closer in the game was a complete non-factor.  Mariano Rivera was healthy, and was irrelevant to the outcome (almost the opposite could be said of ARod, who if you are Yankee fan was all too relevant).  He faced one batter in game 1, and three batters in game 5; that’s it.  Doesn’t that tell us something about being a closer?  How critical can a closer be if the best is irrelevant in a playoff?

The closest parallel that I can think of is a field goal kicker in the NFL.  Games tend to be close, so it quite often comes down whether or not a kicker is successful from some distance at the end of the game.  Succeeding or failing is memorable.  But your opportunities are completely dependent on the players who are actually involved in most of the plays.  The offense has to get into field goal range (and not score a touchdown) for you to be a factor in the game and the defense has to stop the other team often enough for 3 points to matter.  Similarly, as used now, a team has to be ahead by a smallish margin at the end of the game for the closer to have any significance to the outcome, which has to lead you to believe that that significance is vastly overrated.

Mariano Rivera is the best closer of his time.  The Yankees vs Tigers series makes me wonder what that means.  It certainly should be kept in mind when talking of him as being one of the all time Yankee greats or thinking about closers as MVPs or Hall of Famers.  I don’t see how you can be considered one of the greats if you play a position that can be demonstrated to not matter.

Some thoughts on baseball/sports

The typical Michael Oakeshott essay was to define two ideal, opposite types, explore their respective attributes, show why in their pure form the two types were unsustainable, and then indicate a clear preference for one of the two types (usually the one that was currently recessive rather than dominant).  The start of the baseball playoffs and the dramatic end to the regular season along with discussions of adding another wild card team points out how useful Oakeshott’s framework is for looking at sports. 

One pole or type in sports would be the purely competitive.  Its main feature is the attempt to find the best team or individual in the competition, with its main attribute being a rather lengthy season and a more or less balanced schedule or competitive platform in order to reduce as far as possible the element of luck.  A good example of this idea is the older format in baseball where the leagues determined their champions through the regular season without any playoffs.  The major tournaments in golf which had a next day, 18 hole playoff in case of tie, is also emblematic of this type.

The other type I would call the dramatic-commercial and as the name suggests the emphasis is on drama, and excitement.  It is a reaction to the real or imagined problems inherent in the competitive model.  In the baseball scenario discussed above most of the teams would be eliminated from competition fairly early with a corresponding loss in fan interest.  More teams making the playoffs means more fans following their teams through the entire season.  A sudden death playoff in golf means a winner will be determined on Sunday along with the inherent drama of one hole deciding everything.  The NBA’s rule that allows a team to call a timeout and advance the ball past mid-court is rules example of the dramatic-commercial (a rule which makes no sense from a pure competition standpoint).  When A’s general manager Billy Beane described the baseball playoffs as “a crapshoot” he was drawing a contrast between the competitive and dramatic-commercial types in baseball.

From the above perspective, it is easy to see general sports discussions like a playoff system in college football or an additional wild card team in baseball as attempts at finding the right balance between competition and drama.  And as sports has become more and more driven by television and commercial considerations it shouldn’t surprise that most of the changes have been in the direction of adding excitement, drama, fan involvement to sports at the expense of its competitive elements.

Addendum: at NRO this post touches on the same subject : http://www.nationalreview.com/right-field/279579/it-really-just-about-money-michael-potemra

A football thought

I assume there is something like sabermetrics for football, but I haven't seen it.  While I'm no stathead there are football statistics that I think are flawed.

Running backs tend to be evaluated by average yards per carry.  But average is a terrible stat, often concealing more than it reveals (the median would be a little better here).  Since the passing game tends to be more of an all or nothing venture, I think what you want from your rushing game is consistent yardage.  You run not only to keep the defense off balance but to stay out of long distance situations, and to pick up short yardage first downs.  Average yards per carry doesn't address this at all.  If a back runs for sixty yards on one carry, and gets zero yards on nine other carries, the average is a healthy six yards but you've only had one positive play out of ten.  If you face a third and two, how confident would you be in running for it? 

I'd argue a better measure would be the percentage of carries over a certain benchmark, say three yards, plus first down carries for shorter distances.  That is,you'd get credit if you got two yards on a third or fourth and one.  This statistical measure would I think accurately work to the advantage of a Larry Csonka type and against a Barry Sanders style back. 

Why Tiger won't catch Nicklaus - in theory

Via a tweet by John Podhoretz, a very interesting essay on golf and Tiger Woods by Charles Murray
http://www.american.com/archive/2010/july/why-tiger-wont-catch-jack

Seve, his caddie and democracy

His death has brought about the telling of a great many Seve Ballesteros stories.  As I recall the talented and mercurial golfer was almost always getting into it with his caddies.  The story is told that during one of these tempests, Seve is complaining, telling his caddie he’s worthless, etc. and then says “I don’t blame you, I blame me for hiring you.”

This comes to mind when I hear the usual voter complaints, decrying Washington and politicians.  The complaints aren’t without merit, but left alone they are deficient.  To be complete they should, paraphrasing Seve, conclude with “I don’t blame you, I blame us for voting for you.”

Baseball trade deadline - some thoughts

The major league baseball trade deadline comes up on Sunday, so it seems to be as good a time as any to put together some thoughts on a how a team should proceed.  For teams like the Yankees and Red Sox, of course there really isn’t a decision; you’re always in the market to add.  The following is from the perspective of the Minnesota Twins but is applicable to other teams of similar means:

1. Let’s start with the most controversial.  I take it that as a GM your first obligation is to the owner and that the benefits of winning a championship are less than the costs of being really bad.  This is an insight from behavioral economics; that the cost benefit curves aren’t the same (losing five dollars makes you feel worse than finding five dollars makes you feel good).  Interest in a club is something of a habit which is formed over years of being in contention.  Re-establishing interest after you’ve been really bad for a couple of years is really difficult both on the field (players will gravitate towards success) and with fans.  See Twins, World Series champions in ’87 and ’91 and the talk of contraction (end of the 90’s ???)
2. Supply and demand applies to baseball just like everywhere else.  Teams are going to be extremely reluctant to give up on a season by being sellers when there is still a good share of that season to be played (neither the players or the fans are going to be happy with you).  In general I’d say there are likely to be more potential buyers than sellers, which means it will be a sellers market.
3. A typical deal involves the buyer trading future prospects for a current asset, usually at a pretty steep discount rate.  It follows from the present for future aspect of these trades that the more of these you make--that is the more consecutive years you’re a buyer--the more likely it is that your future success will be imperiled.  See point #1
4. Even the really good deadline/mid-season deals should give you pause.  In ’84 the Cubs picked up Rick Sutcliffe who pitched them to the playoffs.  But they gave up a young Joe Carter.  In effect the Cubs traded Joe Carter’s career for a few good seasons from Sutcliffe.  Similarly, in ’87 the Tigers picked up Doyle Alexander whose pitching allowed them to squeak by the Blue Jays to win the AL East (they lost to the Twins in the AL playoffs).  A great deal for the Tigers, except that they traded John Smoltz to get him.
5. Beware of what I would call the weak division trap.  This is when you are in contention not because you’re an especially good team or because you’re having a good season but because you are in a bad division.  The Twins this year are a perfect example of this.  They are 5.5 games out at the moment, but look at their record and the breakdown by division:

	Wins	Loss	Total	Win %
AL East	8	19	27	0.296
AL Central	22	17	39	0.564
AL West	12	10	22	0.545
National	8	10	18	0.444
	50	56	106	0.472

Against the current playoff teams the picture isn’t any brighter:

	Wins	Loss	Total	Win %
Tigers	1	8	9	0.111
Red Sox	1	3	4	0.250
Yankees	1	2	3	0.333
Rangers	4	3	7	0.571
	7	16	23	0.304

The Twins run differential is -82 the worst in the division, across all of baseball only the Astros, Cubs, and Orioles are worse.  So yes, at 5.5 games back you’re in contention, but you aren’t good.  The latter should take precedence.

According to today’s Minneapolis Star & Tribune the Twins are currently buyers rather than sellers.  I can see why the Twins officials would say that to the public.  I just hope they’re not telling the truth.

U.S. Open

A few thoughts on the U.S. Open

1)  A big part of the appeal of the U.S. Open is the chance to see a great golf course.  The best sites make you want desperately to play the course and imbed certain holes or features in your memory.  A course like Pebble Beach has a big advantage, but you don't need to hug an ocean to have memorable holes. 

While Congressional seems to be a decent course and the 18th, with the water on the left and huge clubhouse on the hill in the foreground, is a really nice hole, it is not an especially memorable site for the Open.  It's not to the level of say Oakmont (the church pew bunkers, the 9th green), next year's site Olympic, or Merion which is coming up.

2)  There was a lot of criticism that the course was too easy.  As I posted before I think the USGA, when it tries to protect par, generally ruins the tournament.  They didn't do that this year.  Throw McIlroy out and the winning score is -8 which is just right, especially when the par is 71.

We also got to see one aspect of the criticism rebutted on Sunday.  Andy North and Curtis Strange complained about the tees being moved up on the long par 5 ninth on Saturday, which turned it into a birdie hole as players could reach the green in two.  So on Sunday they had the tees back and the hole was completely non-descript.  Unlike on Saturday, there was no decision to make, no penalty for driving the ball in the rough, the players drove, hit a shortish lay up shot regardless of whether they were in the fairway or not, and then tried to get close with a wedge.

3)  The difference for McIlroy was his putting.  His Master's collapse didn't start on the 10th it started much earlier when he bogied the first, and came about not because he started driving the ball in the direction of the surrounding houses but because he was missing key, par saving putts.  Putting was also his downfall in the PGA last year, when he had numerous opportunities but couldn't get his birdie attempts to fall.

4)  The thing you notice about McIlroy's swing is how square he has the club at the top.  It always seems to be pointing straight down his target line.  I don't believe in playing golf by trying to get into a number of different positions through the swing, but at the top is the exception.  Set it square at that point like McIlroy does and you just have to let it go to hit it straight.

5)  Let's wait and see before we start proclaiming him the next Tiger.  Again I think it will come down to putting, where Tiger didn't miss anything of importance for over a decade.  McIlroy looked much, much better with the blade this week, but it's just one week.  And because of the recency of Tiger's wins, the standard has been distorted.  Take Jack and Tiger out of it and you realize that 4 - 6 majors puts you in the game's elite.

U.S. Open Golf Championship - scoring

As anyone who follows golf knows, it's U.S. Open week, with the tournament being played at Congressional this year.  I watch all the major tournaments and will no doubt tune in this week, but the U.S. Open has struck me as misguided for a very long time, confusing 'finding the best golfer' with protecting par.

In the last decade the median winning score in the U.S. Open was -2 compared to the median for the British Open -8.5 and The Masters -10.5.  Does the U.S Open do a better job of determining the best golfer than the other majors?  I rather doubt it, and I think anyone who watches the tournament or listens to the commentary will doubt it as well.  It isn't so much the relatively high winning score (par is rather arbitrary) as that the USGA philosophy is so committed to bringing out the inner accountant in the players.  Hit the fairway, hit the green, two putts for par and go to the next hole, whatever you do don't become impatient and actually attempt a risky shot in the attempt to make a birdie or better.  Is that really what you want from your national champion?

Now, first I think having a philosophy, any philosophy, and imposing it on the tournament year after year is a mistake.  The U.S Open moves around, being played on the best courses in what is a very big country.  Why not have the courses dictate the tournament rather than having tournament officials come in and try to make disparate sites as near to each other as possible. 

And second, if the U.S Open is known for defending par it is also known for having courses get away from it.  By trying to make the course difficult the USGA has too often not lessened the role of luck in determining a winner but increased it. 

Perhaps the player who best epitomizes what I have in mind passed away last month.  Seve Ballesteros was undeniably one of the best golfers of his era and Seve had no chance to win a U.S Open.  That he contended (at Oakmont I believe) at all is far more surprising than that he never won it.  Seve played with flair, he was an artist with clubs not an accountant.  He won and regularly contended at The Masters and The British Open but not in the U.S Open.  That's what's wrong with the U.S. Open.

Points Differential - NBA Finals through 4 games

An ESPN report on the finals noted the margin of victory through four games and placed it in historical perspective by noting that there have only been a few instances where the margin has been less or the same. 

One example given was the '69 finals between Boston and LA.  Like this year's series, the total differential is equal to 15 points.  But of course margin of victory is aligned with total points.   So looking at that '69 series one notes that while the margins match this finals the points don't.  Average combined points through 4 games of that series equaled 215.25 compared to this year's 176.75.  That is 22% higher.  So the '69 series, at least by the standard of points differential, was actually much closer than this year's finals through 4 games.

Not your father's NBA

I caught a bit of the PTI interview with Mark Jackson, the new head coach of the Warriors.  Jackson emphasized that the game "starts at the defensive end of the court."  That is indeed today's NBA.  How different that is from the NBA I knew, when it was clearly offensive oriented. 

This morning I took a look at the 1985 finals between the Lakers (Magic, Kareem, Worthy) and the Celtics (Bird, McHale, Parrish). In that series no team scored less than 100 points (Boston was low with exactly 100 in game 6) and the highest score was 148.  Average combined score for the series was 229, with the median equal to 221.5.

In the current series, no team has reached 100 points.  The combined average score is 176.75, or a 22.8% drop from the '85 series.  The median combined score is 175 which equates to a 22.0% decline.